camps listed by the United Nations camp-management cluster reportedly have no water or sanitation agency, and most are far from reaching the established guidelines for sanitation in humanitarian emergencies. 3 The living conditions of most of Haiti's poor, whether they're living in camps or communities, are equally miserable in terms of the risk of diarrheal disease.
The reported numbers of cases and deaths, though shocking, represent only a fraction of the epidemic's true toll. We have seen scores of patients die at the gates of the hospital or within minutes after admission. Through our network of community health workers, we have learned of hundreds of patients who died at home or en route to the hospital. In the first 48 hours, the case fatality rate at our facilities was as high as 10%. Though it dropped to less than 2% in the ensuing days as the health system was reinforced locally and patients began to present earlier in the course of disease, mortality will most likely climb as the disease spreads and Haiti's fragile health system falters.
This most recent crisis in Haiti has reinforced certain lessons regarding the provision of services to the poor. Complementary prevention and care should be the primary focus of the relief effort. Vaccination must be considered as an adjunct for controlling the epidemic, and antibiotics should be used in the treatment of all hospitalized patients. These endeavors should proceed in concert with muchneeded improvements to sanitation and accessibility of potable water. More generally, reliable partnerships are essential, especially if local partners are dependable and have practical experience and complementary assets. Long-term reinforcement of the public-sector health system is a wise investment, permitting provision of a basic minimum set of services that can be built upon in times of crisis. And community health workers who can be rapidly mobilized as educators, distributors of supplies, and first responders are a reliable backbone of health care. In Haiti, such workers can bring the timesensitive lifesaving therapy of oral rehydration right to the patient's door. dation is interpreted to mean that only patients who present with "severe dehydration" (≥10% dehydration) should be given antibiotics. By contrast, the ICDDR,B recommends antibiotics for patients with cholera who have severe dehydration as well as for those with "some dehydration" (5 to 10%) who continue to pass large volumes of diarrheal stool during their treatment. These recommendations apply only to patients who have symptoms typical of cholera -that is, less than 24 hours of acute watery diarrhea with dehydration and usually vomiting. It is crucial in triage to rapidly assess dehydration, rule out alternative causes of diarrhea that are common in areas with poor sanitation and coexisting infections, and rehydrate aggressively according to the WHO protocols.
With effective antibiotic therapy, the purging rate is lessened by about 50%, the illness is shortened by about 50%, and the duration of excretion of Vibrio cholerae in the stool is shortened to 1 or 2 days. Without effective antibiotic therapy, patients continue to excrete V. cholerae for 5 or more days and shed for a longer period at home. 1-3 If antibiotics are used, patients recover more quickly and require less rehydration fluid. Nursing care is lessened, and patients are able to leave the treatment center earlier, as demonstrated in a study that showed dramatic resolution of diarrhea at 24 hours with azithromycin. 1 This approach maximizes the effectiveness of limited resources while optimizing patient care.
Regarding transmission, ricewater stools contain 10 11 to 10 12 V. cholerae organisms per liter. An infectious dose is 10 5 to 10 8 organisms. These numbers might explain why 50% of household contacts of a patient who is the index case in Bangladesh develop diarrhea about 2 days after the index case occurs. 4 Although some of these household contacts may have been infected from the same source as the index patient, many others are likely to be true secondary cases. Direct data are not available to determine whether household contacts are protected when the index case is treated with antibiotics. However, given the liter volumes of diarrhea, antibiotics will decrease contamination in the household.
We do not, however, recommend antibiotic prophylaxis for household contacts because of the programmatic difficulty in restricting the use of such prophylaxis only to those persons in the immediate family who are at highest risk 5 and because doing so would almost certainly drive antibiotic resistance. Since families of patients with cholera are at high risk for cholera themselves, they need targeted education about safe water and sanitation, appropriate home use of oral rehydration solution, and information about the availability of treatment facilities in case illness does occur.
Some may argue that emphasizing the importance of antibiotic therapy may lead to the misguided belief that this is the most important component in the overall management of patients with cholera. With careful training in instituting appropriate and aggressive rehydration followed by effective antibiotic therapy, this misunderstanding need not occur.
A practical reason for hesitancy regarding administering antibiotics to patients with cholera relates to the severe vomiting that usually accompanies infection. Vomiting generally stops within a few hours after patients are rehydrated; thus, the administration of the antibiotic should be delayed until the patient is able to take food and drink without vomiting. Doxycycline can be associated with nausea and should be taken with food and plenty of fluids.
In summary, the use of antibiotics is an urgent issue for all stakeholders, because effective antibiotic therapy shortens the duration of illness and reduces the shedding of thousands of infectious doses. Our goal is to promote more effective care for large numbers of patients with cholera while maximizing limited resources to keep patients who are discharged early from dying, reduce the number of repeat hospital admissions, and limit athome shedding of V. cholerae. To achieve these aims, we believe that patients with moderate and severe cholera should be treated with antibiotics -especially in Haiti, and especially now. N ow that health insurance reform has begun, safety-net programs throughout the United States are struggling to adapt their missions to suit the postreform composition of the uninsured population. Most such programs are organized at the local level, with funding largely premised on their serving low-income uninsured residents. Examples include well-structured comprehensive care programs in some major cities, more than 1000 limited-service free clinics, and dozens of volunteer physicianreferral programs.
When the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is fully implemented, 8% of the U.S. population is projected to remain uninsured. Other than undocumented immigrants, however, most such people will be eligible for Medicaid or highly subsidized private insurance and will be subject to tax penalties if they don't obtain coverage. So beginning in 2014, most people who are currently served by access programs for the uninsured will have insurance, be eligible for insurance, or be undocumented immigrants.
Some people will remain uninsured because their income is too high for a subsidy but low enough to make insurance unaffordable (costing more than 8% of their household income). But subsidies will be available to people with family incomes up to 400% of the federal poverty level, which currently calculates to $88,200 for a family of fourwell above the country's median household income of about $50,000.
Access programs for the uninsured usually serve people with household incomes below about twice the federal poverty level. They may therefore be hard pressed to adapt their missions to the new uninsured population in ways that will maintain their fragile support from funders and volunteers. Since safety-net systems are already on life support, 1 any major shock may threaten their very existence. Therefore, access programs must consider carefully how best to refocus and justify their function and mission.
First, health care reform's chickens should not be counted until they've hatched. During the 3 years before full implementation begins, constitutional challenges and conservative politicians threaten to upend the ACA. 2 Safety-net programs must remain intact at least until reform takes effect -and just in case it never does. Second, even after reform, the newly insured will face barriers to access arising from provider shortages, transportation difficulties, and language differences -all of which safety-net organizations can help to overcome. Third, the future uninsured population will probably deserve more safety-net support than one might imagine. Some people will be uninsured temporarily when their economic circumstances change. New workers may earn enough to lose their subsidy for individual insurance but remain ineligible for group insurance during the 3-month probationary period that employers may impose. People without good jobs whose income increases just enough to nudge them over 138% of the poverty level will be disqualified from Medicaid and be required to purchase subsidized private insurance. It may be difficult to make this publicto-private transition smoothly. Medicaid enrollment can start instantaneously, sometimes even retroactively, but private coverage typically begins on the first day of the month after all forms have been completed and the initial check has cleared.
If the experience in Massachusetts is any guide, these wrinkles will probably cause shortterm coverage gaps for many people (see table) . Coverage discontinuity will also occur within households, when different family members qualify for coverage from different sources, depending on their citizenship and employment status. Safety-net programs can therefore serve a critical function in maintaining
